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Abstract 
This article provides an examination and analysis of the laws and regulations on 
environmental liability, in light of the growing global concern of oil pollution of the 
marine environment. It considers several fundamental legal provisions that have 
attempted to protect the environment and compensate the victims of oil pollution and 
assesses the extent to which these provisions have achieved these aims. A recent 
high profile incident has reinstated the issue as a worldwide public concern and 
provides context for this article. 
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Introduction 
Oil pollution has once again had devastating effects as a result of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon incident, which attracted worldwide media attention and raised concerns 
regarding marine pollution. As a result, the laws relating to environmental protection 
from oil pollution and laws regulating the compensation and liability elements 
involved have been revisited for debate. This article will examine this topical and 
interesting area of law.  
It has been asserted by Young that: 
The ocean has absorbed and biodegraded significantly more oil than the 
world's population to date has discharged, allowing time for the [legal] regime 
to learn how to become more effective.2  
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However, this should not be seen as a justification for allowing legal regimes, 
adopted in relation to oil pollution of the marine environment, to operate at the slow 
pace that they so often do. Others are not so optimistic about the ocean‟s continuing 
ability to rectify man‟s mistakes, as „the ongoing increase in world oil consumption 
implies a limit even to the ocean's absorptive abilities.‟3  
A number of oil spills, primarily as a result of tanker incidents, initially instigated a 
reaction from those concerned about the environment and subsequently the law 
reacted accordingly. It has therefore been suggested that „the evolution of the oil 
pollution regime could be characterised as reactive rather than anticipatory.‟4 Taking 
legislative action as a response to an oil disaster only secures protection for future 
incidents. Although this is beneficial to the environment and those using it in the 
future, it demonstrates a weakness in the law‟s ability to take preventative action and 
potentially avoid considerable levels of damage to the marine environment. It is 
therefore evident that „prevention rather than response after the event is the most 
appropriate response.‟5 The Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, which is considered 
Britain‟s worst and most damaging oil spill, has been claimed to provide proof that 
„big oil spills plague ecosystems for decades.‟6 Commentators have also claimed 
that:  
The cost of putting right such extensive environmental damage is huge, 
and…the company that was responsible for the Torrey Canyon should be 
paying for it under the polluter-pays principle but the international laws 
weren't in place back then.7  
The „polluter pays‟ principle aims to ensure that „the costs of dealing with pollution 
are not borne by the public authorities but are directed to the polluter.‟8 The principle 
is reflected in many of the objectives of the legislation enacted to deal with attributing 
liability for remediation and clean up costs.  
The Torrey Canyon disaster demonstrated the scale of the problem in relation to oil 
pollution and therefore arguably had very beneficial consequences. Until this point, 
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pollution control was a seemingly minor concern but this incident raised awareness 
and ultimately resulted in an international response and the creation of international 
maritime regulations on pollution of the sea. In particular it was realised that there 
was no scheme in place to properly compensate those who had suffered as a result 
of this incident. It was also recognised that improving protection of the environment 
and the sea poses diverse challenges for the law, as marine pollution does not 
recognise national boundaries.9 The transboundary nature of the oil and shipping 
industry requires an international response whereby laws and principles apply extra-
territorially. This means that „internationally agreed and universally applied standards 
[are] an absolute prerequisite.‟10  
It was therefore proposed that there be a permanent international body to promote 
safety in the maritime industry more effectively. This proposal was confirmed with the 
establishment of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, which 
was later renamed the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1982. As a result 
of a huge growth in the amount of oil transported by sea in the 1960s, the concern of 
oil pollution emerged, requiring attention from the IMO. They therefore set about 
introducing a number of measures to tackle the problem of oil pollution. This article 
will examine those measures and consider both their effectiveness in minimising 
damage following an incident as well as their ability to provide sufficient 
compensation to both those who have suffered damage and the environment. 
 
1 An International Problem – an International Legislative Response 
The international law relating to marine pollution is contained primarily in a number of 
Conventions, made under the auspices of the IMO, which are the basis of most 
maritime law. The development of these international instruments – in response to 
the concern of oil pollution in the 1960s – began with the IMO‟s introduction of the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973, known as 
the MARPOL Convention. This is the main Convention governing the prevention of 
pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. 
Following an initially slow rate of ratification, the IMO removed some of the complex 
and costly requirements of the 1973 Convention meaning that the only part of 
MARPOL needing immediate ratification was the part dealing with oil in Annex I. It is 
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significant that the area deemed most important and thus still needing immediate 
ratification was the part dealing with oil. This was an important step in setting the 
problem of oil pollution at an internationally recognised level of severity and one that 
has not been ignored or softened by legislation. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 led to demands for additional legislative action to 
support preventative oil pollution measures. This was specifically aimed at 
introducing double-hulled tankers to replace all single-hulled tankers as a means to 
lessen pollution potential. It has been estimated that „if the Exxon Valdez had had a 
double-hull structure, the amount of the spill would have been reduced by more than 
half.‟11 Further amendments were adopted in 2001, following the sinking of the Erika, 
bringing in a new global timetable for accelerating the phase-out of single-hulled oil 
tankers. However, the IMO subsequently revised the phase-in timetable after the 
sinking of the single-hulled tanker Prestige in 2002. This incident provided further 
acknowledgment of the need to speed up the phase-out time limits and consequently 
resulted in additional amendments to Annex I of MARPOL in 2003. These 
amendments brought the final phasing-out date for single-hulled tankers forward from 
2015 to 2010. Although the changes to the time limits reflect the European Union‟s 
(EU) recognition of a need to speed up the introduction of the important preventative 
measures, they also seem insufficient when compared to the legislative responsive 
by the United States (US). Following the Exxon Valdez accident, „the US became the 
first to ban all single-hulled oil tankers from its ports without waiting for agreement by 
IMO.‟12 This contrast questions the ability of international conventions to legislate 
effectively and ensure enforcement of such important measures. Arguably a stricter 
initial approach, as demonstrated by the US, is more effective in preventing pollution 
from oil spills, negating the responsive approach of learning lessons from subsequent 
disasters. 
In general, the changes introduced by the MARPOL Convention „have made some 
contribution towards reducing deliberate pollution from ships.‟13 Independent 
estimates made between 1960 and 1990 confirm a consensus that „international oil 
pollution decreased over time, especially after MARPOL‟s signature in 1973.‟14 It is 
fair to say that the new equipment requirements introduced by MARPOL have been 
complied with to a high degree and the „reduced discharges when such equipment 
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was used also suggest that total oil inputs declined.‟15 An impartial expert study also 
concluded that MARPOL „regulations have resulted in a major reduction of 
international pollution.‟16 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that international Conventions have contributed 
towards improved safety and operation in the shipping industry, which in turn has 
helped to reduce accidents that can to some extent be prevented. However, it is 
suggested that the law in this area moves at a slow pace and the IMO is „not known 
for its lightning speed of reaction and response.‟17 It is therefore very important to 
both consider alternative and more stringent preventative measures, as well as 
ensuring an effective legislative structure is in place to deal with the consequences of 
such disasters when they do happen. 
 
2 Liability and Compensation – an International Approach 
Despite more stringent regulations on the shipping industry, aimed at reducing oil 
pollution of the marine environment, there will always be a need to have a legal 
structure in place that determines what happens in the aftermath of an oil spill. 
Churchill has noted that the very existence of liability schemes favouring the victims 
of pollution damage may well encourage shipowners to take more care in observing 
the standards which are designed to prevent pollution.18 If this is the case then 
responsive legislation can be said to contribute towards the primary aim of 
international law relating to marine pollution, which is prevention. 
Dealing with the consequences of oil pollution damage is a difficult and expensive 
process, which is why two extremely important international agreements were 
adopted in 1969 and 1971 to deal with liability and compensation in this field. The 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC) and 
the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (FUND) – 
both amended by Protocol in 1992 – were introduced in an attempt to remedy the 
inadequate provisions available „to enable Governments, and others affected by oil 
pollution damage, to recover the considerable expenditure involved in preventative 
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measures and cleaning-up operations.‟19 Beforehand, there had often been problems 
in identifying who should be responsible for any damage caused, difficulties in 
proving fault on the part of the shipowner, a reluctance of courts to assume 
jurisdiction in some cases, and difficulties with enforcement. Furthermore, the 
compensation awarded frequently exceeded the financial resources of the 
shipowner. The adoption of the two new Conventions attempted to overcome the 
difficulties faced by the victims of oil pollution. In turn, although an anthropocentric 
approach, the environment would receive an ancillary benefit from the introduction of 
these conventions, as it would be easier for victims and governments to receive 
compensation, enabling them to address any environmental issues resulting from oil 
spills and to regenerate the affected area. 
The two Conventions are very similar in structure and although they do not cover all 
types of claims for oil pollution, they do apply to most spills from tankers that carry 
cargoes of oil. Both Conventions provide for strict liability up to a maximum limit and 
require ships to be issued with certificates attesting that adequate insurance is in 
place to meet the owner‟s liabilities under the Convention.20 The two Conventions 
work in conjunction with each other to provide a more extensive and higher level of 
compensation for victims of oil pollution damage, ensuring additional compensation 
in major cases involving substantial costs. The CLC entered into force in 1975 and 
governs the liability of shipowners for oil spills from tankers. The 1976 Protocol, 
which came into force in 1981, provided for the expression of liability to be in terms of 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which were then calculated by reference to the 
tonnage of the ship. A further Protocol in 1984 increased the limits of liability and 
„improved scope and enhanced compensation‟,21 but by 1992 this had still not 
entered into force and was then superseded by the 1992 Protocol, which came into 
force in May 1996. The 1992 Protocol recognised „the need to ensure the entry into 
force of the content of the 1984 Protocol as soon as possible‟22 and, as a result, 
changed the entry into force requirements from six to only four tanker-owning 
countries.  
   
Although the CLC represented a progressive step in the recognition of the 
importance of oil as a pollutant in the marine environment, it was also understood 
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that further provision would be necessary to cover instances where insufficient 
compensation was available under it. The CLC was seen as providing a basic level of 
compensation that attributed costs to the shipowner as the carrier of the oil. To add a 
second layer to the available compensation scheme the FUND Convention was 
adopted in 1971. This established the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
(IOPC Fund), which effectively allows for top-up funding when the limited liability of a 
shipowner is inadequate to cover the costs of damage and compensation. This 
second tier of compensation was to be payable by the owners of the oil itself. This is 
an important concept in relation to the increasingly adopted „polluter pays‟ principle. 
This joint contribution and liability placed upon both the shipowner and the oil 
companies mirrors the expectation of society that those responsible for pollution of 
the environment pay for the damage they have caused. In this respect, the legislation 
is satisfactory and seems reasonable. 
The 1971 FUND Convention was replaced by the 1992 FUND Convention. When a 
state becomes party to the 1992 FUND Convention they become a member of the 
IOPC Fund, which is financed by: 
Contributions levied on any person who has received in a calendar year more 
than 150,000 tonnes of crude oil or heavy fuel oil after sea transport in a 1992 
Fund Member State.‟23  
 
Following the Erika sinking it was clear that limitation amounts were too restrictive; as 
a result, in October 2000 the Legal Committee of the IMO adopted two Resolutions 
increasing the compensation limits of the CLC and FUND Convention by 50 per cent. 
These amendments increased the maximum amount payable by the 1992 Fund to 
203 million SDR „for any one incident occurring on or after 1 November 2003, 
including the sum actually paid by the shipowner or his insurer.‟24 This increase in 
compensation inevitably meant greater financial contributions by those responsible 
for any damage caused. This continued recognition of a need to increase the 
amounts available for victims is a reflection of the importance of this legislation.  
 
Comparing the original international regime before the introduction of the IOPC Fund 
to the position following its entry into force demonstrates the improved effectiveness 
and ability of the international regime to meet the primary objectives of the 1992 
Conventions. The Conventions aimed to:  
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Provide compensation to claimants as quickly as possible and without the 
necessity for claimants to go to court, and to do this in an internationally 
uniform manner, treating all claimants under the system equally, irrespective of 
where the damage occurred.‟25 
 
The comparison is well demonstrated when contrasting the Amoco Cadiz case, 
which occurred before the introduction of the IOPC Fund, and the Tanio case, which 
occurred after. At the time of the Amoco Cadiz disaster, France had not yet ratified 
the 1971 Convention establishing the IOPC Fund, meaning that compensation was 
limited to the ceiling imposed by the CLC. The amount of compensation available 
from the limitation fund under the CLC was extremely low and only covered one tenth 
of the amount claimed. The pollution victims therefore sought an alternative legal 
course, which resulted in thirteen years of complex litigation and concluded with only 
one tenth of the amount claimed being awarded. This was a clear demonstration of 
the limits of the existing legal regime. Arguably, the international community reacted 
positively to the Amoco Cadiz disaster and to the problems associated with the 
limitations imposed by the CLC, and „found a solution reasonably well adapted to 
pollution disasters of this magnitude.‟26 This was demonstrated in the Tanio case 
where nearly 70 per cent. of the amount claimed was awarded within three to five 
years of the incident.27 On 7 March 1980, two years after the Amoco Cadiz spill, the 
oil tanker Tanio spilled more than 13,500 tons of oil into the sea. Although the 
amount of oil spilled was far less than the Amoco Cadiz spill, the clean up costs were 
almost the same. Unlike the Amoco case, the victims of the Tanio disaster were 
compensated „discretely and adequately, within the framework of a well adapted 
compensation scheme.‟28 This suggests that the FUND Convention fulfilled its 
purpose in filling the gaps left by the CLC and provided additional compensation in 
cases where the costs were substantial. 
 
In May 2003, further increases to the limitation amounts were seen with a Protocol to 
the FUND Convention, which provided a third tier of compensation by establishing 
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund. This is financed 
by levies imposed on oil receivers in states which are parties to the Protocol. 
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Membership of the Supplementary Fund is optional and is open to any state that is a 
member of the 1992 Fund. Together with the existing IOPC Fund it makes it possible 
to cover up to 750 million SDR in respect of any one incident. Although this is not 
available to cover disasters which have taken place in the past, such as the Erika, it 
is an important step in attempting to change the way future incidents are dealt with 
and, more importantly, the potential to act in some ways as a measure with sufficient 
deterrent qualities to limit the occurrence of incidents causing extensive damage. 
This increase in available compensation is also beneficial in terms of increasing out 
of court settlements, thereby enabling quicker resolutions. This is an advantage to 
small claimants who are often unable to bear the financial burden of pursuing 
litigation.  However, notwithstanding the clear improvements to the system, it remains 
inadequate in some respects, particularly in relation to situations where innocent 
victims are unable to claim as a result of their damage or loss suffered falling outside 
the scope of the conventions. 
 
Although continued increases on the limitation ceiling for liability is a positive step in 
relation to oil pollution, it is arguably still not enough to offer preventative protection of 
the marine environment. It has been advocated that „liability regimes can serve an 
incentive function only when the likelihood that responsible parties will actually pay 
for damages is sufficiently high.‟29 At first glance, the extension of the scope of the 
CLC and FUND Conventions in terms of maximum compensation amounts, as well 
as the introduction of the Supplementary Fund, seems to suggest that responsible 
parties will be made to pay for the damages that they have caused. It also suggests 
that the financial burden would be sufficiently high. However, Brunnee questions this, 
stating: 
Other commentators have pointed out that the liability limitations in most 
international regimes may actually have the reverse effects, removing 
incentives to take stricter prevention measures.30 
 
If this is the case then it is an important issue for consideration at an international 
level to ensure that the financial implications for polluters are significant enough to 
act as both an incentive and a deterrent. If international law is unable to provide a 
sufficient regime to ensure enforcement of the „polluter pays‟ principle, then it is 
inevitable that other legal regimes will aim to cover the costs that are not 
compensated for by the international compensation funds.  
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3 Liability - A Different Perspective 
A decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), following the Erika disaster, has 
examined the issue of liability for oil pollution of the marine environment from a 
different perspective. The case of Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA and 
Total International Ltd31 considered liability from the perspective of EU waste law and 
has „potentially far-reaching effects.‟32 This means that liability for clean up costs may 
be incurred not only by the shipowner but also by „other parties under legislation 
which treats the spilt oil as waste and imposes obligations on them to pay for the cost 
of its disposal.‟33 This case also brought into question the ability of the CLC and 
FUND Conventions to provide full compensation for the cost of clean-up operations, 
and highlighted a need for legislative change at both an international and a European 
level.  
The case was a preliminary reference from the French Cour De Cassation, in relation 
to the sinking of the oil tanker Erika. The Italian company ENEL concluded a contract 
with Total International Ltd to deliver 30,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil to be used for 
energy production. Total International Ltd chartered the oil tanker Erika, flying the 
Maltese flag, to transport the fuel oil from Dunkirk to Milazzo. The Erika later sank, 
spilling her cargo and bunker oil into the sea and polluting the French coastline. 
Following the incident, compensation was sought by multiple claimants for the cost of 
clean-up operations and other preventative pollution measures. By 24 September 
2008 „7,130 claims for compensation had been submitted for a total of €211m.‟34 
These claims exceeded the financial limit of the international compensation regime 
under the CLC and FUND Conventions. „In these circumstances the municipality of 
Mesquer…brought a claim independently of the international regime‟,35 instigating 
proceedings against Total International Ltd and Total France SA for „reimbursement 
of the cost of cleaning and anti-pollution operations on its coastal territory, relying on 
the Waste Directive.‟36 
The first Framework Directive on Waste (Directive 75/442)37 was adopted in 1975 to 
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formalise and harmonise measures within member states. This Directive has since 
been amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC38 of 18 March 1991 and more 
recently codified in Directive 2006/12/EC.39 For the purposes of the Erika case, 
decisions were determined by reference to the date of the incident itself, and 
therefore on the pre-consolidated position before 2006.  The essential objective of 
Directive 75/442 „should be the protection of human health and the environment 
against harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, treatment, storage and 
tipping of waste.‟40 This would suggest that the marine environment should be 
protected against the harmful effects of spilled oil, dependent on the question of 
whether „hydrocarbons accidentally spilled at sea constituted “waste” within the 
meaning of the Directive.‟41 If considered „waste‟, then Total International Ltd and 
Total France SA should be liable for the costs involved in disposal of the waste oil, in 
their capacity as „previous holders‟ or „producer of the product from which the waste 
came‟ under Article 15 (b) of the Directive.42 Directive 75/442 defines „waste‟ in 
Article 1.1(a) as meaning „any substance or object in the categories set out in Annex 
I which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard.‟43  
 
Annex I provides lists of substances and objects that may be classified as „waste‟ 
and this list includes „materials spilled, lost or having undergone other mishap, 
including any materials, equipment, etc., contaminated as a result of the mishap.‟44 
This would suggest that oil spilled and contaminated as a result of a shipwreck would 
constitute waste for the purposes of Directive 75/442. However, the lists are only 
intended as guidance, meaning that the category of waste referred to in point Q4 
„merely indicates that such materials may fall within the scope of waste‟45 –  
dependent on the circumstances of the situation, the holder‟s actions, and the 
meaning of the term „discard‟.  
These issues were put to the ECJ, the referring French court presenting them with 
three questions. First, the referring court asked whether heavy fuel oil, as the product 
of a refining process, could be classified as waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) 
of Directive 75/442. The Total companies argued that the heavy fuel oil was not 
„waste‟ as it was going to be used for a specific purpose. The second question asked 
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was whether the fuel oil being transported, once spilled as a result of a shipwreck, 
could be considered „waste‟ either in itself or when mixed with water and sediment. 
The final question related to identification of the „polluter‟. The referring court asked 
whether, if the first question was answered in the negative and the second in the 
affirmative, the producer of the heavy fuel oil and/or the seller of that oil and charterer 
of the ship can be responsible for the costs of disposing of the waste, even though at 
the time of the accident (which transformed the oil into waste) it was being 
transported by a third party. 
On 24 June 2008 the ECJ delivered its judgment on the case and the questions put 
forward. In relation to the first question, they held that the fuel oil itself did not 
constitute „waste‟ within the meaning of Directive 75/442. The ECJ had previously 
adopted a very wide definition of „waste‟ and this included products or materials 
occurring as a result of a production process for a different primary object. In the 
case of Palin Granit,46 the ECJ concluded that leftover stone from quarrying was not 
the product primarily sought by the operator of the granite quarry for subsequent use 
and could more properly be described as „production residue‟ and was therefore 
„waste‟. However, in addition to the criterion of whether a substance constitutes a 
production residue, it must be determined whether or not that substance is likely to 
be reused, and if this can happen without further processing. If the product can be 
reused and:  
There is also a financial advantage to the holder in so doing, the likelihood of 
reuse is high. In such circumstances, the substance in question must no longer 
be regarded as a burden which its holder seeks to “discard”, but as a genuine 
product.47  
 
Where this is the case, a „production residue‟ will not be classed as „waste‟ meaning 
that although the fuel oil in question was a „production residue‟ from the process of oil 
refining, it was held not to be waste due to the fact that it was able to be „exploited or 
marketed on economically advantageous terms and [was] capable of actually being 
used as a fuel without requiring prior processing.‟48 
 
In response to the second question, the ECJ held that hydrocarbons accidentally 
spilled at sea, mixed with water and sediment and drifting along the coast of a 
member state until being washed up on that coast, fitted within the category provided 
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for in Annex I, therefore constituting „waste‟ for the purposes of Directive 75/442. As 
identified in previous cases before the ECJ, „the scope of the term waste turns on the 
meaning of the term discard‟,49 thus requiring that the ECJ examine whether 
accidental spillage of hydrocarbons could constitute „an act by which the holder 
discards them within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442.‟50 It has been 
established that the verb 'to discard' cannot be interpreted restrictively and must be 
interpreted in light of the aims of the directive.51 In relation to situations where the 
substance or object is considered „product residue‟, the directive requires that they 
must no longer be capable of being exploited or marketed without prior processing. It 
was therefore concluded that the spilled oil, mixed with water and sediment would no 
longer be a product of value or use in its current state and would therefore require 
prior processing for reuse, following a previous ruling by the ECJ in Van de Walle.52 
    
In that case, the ECJ held that hydrocarbons which had been unintentionally spilled 
from leaking underground tanks at a petrol station, causing contamination of soil and 
groundwater, were considered „waste‟ as they could no longer be reused without 
prior processing. Consequently the spilled oil, mixed with water and sediment, would 
equally be considered „waste‟, as well as a burden which the holder „discards‟. The 
ability to exploit or market hydrocarbons that have mixed with other materials 
remains an unknown possibility. As such, in Commune de Mesquer it was stated 
that: 
Even assuming that it is technically possible, such exploiting or marketing 
would in any event imply prior processing operations which, far from being 
economically advantageous for the holder of the substance, would in fact be a 
significant financial burden.53 
 
Based upon this conclusion, the „holder‟ of the „waste‟ had effectively discarded the 
oil, albeit involuntarily, thus classifying hydrocarbons spilled at sea as „waste‟ within 
the scope of Directive 75/442. 
 
Since Directive 75/442 was held to be applicable to hydrocarbons spilled at sea, the 
ECJ, in relation to the final question, was required to identify who could constitute a 
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„polluter‟ liable for the costs of disposing of the „waste‟. The Court aimed to address 
the purpose of Directive 75/442 by ensuring that those responsible for pollution did 
not escape liability. The ECJ therefore began by discussing the application of the 
„polluter pays‟ principle in accordance with Article 15 of the Directive, which provides 
that: 
In accordance with the "polluter pays" principle, the cost of disposing of waste 
must be borne by: (a) the holder [of the waste] and/or (b) the previous holders 
or the producer of the product from which the waste came.54  
 
Article 1(b) of Directive 75/442 defines the „producer‟ as follows: 
 
Anyone whose activities produce waste ("original producer") and/or anyone 
who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other operations resulting in a 
change in the nature or composition of this waste.55  
 
Article 1(c) defines a „holder‟ as „the producer of the waste or the natural or legal 
person who is in possession of it.‟56 Possession is not defined in Directive 75/442 
itself but has received its common meaning, and entails „simply effective control and 
does not presuppose any proprietary or other legal rights in the object.‟57 This was 
reflected in the ECJ‟s decision in the case of Van de Walle, where the spilled 
hydrocarbons were in the possession of the petrol station manager at the time that 
they effectively became „waste‟, thus enabling him to be regarded as the „producer‟ of 
the waste.  As he had both possessed and produced the waste in question, he also 
became the „holder‟ of that waste.  
 
Following this decision the ECJ concluded that in relation to the Erika shipwreck, the 
national court could regard the owner of the ship as a „producer‟ of the waste on 
account of the fact that: 
The owner of the ship carrying…hydrocarbons is in fact in possession of them 
immediately before they become waste. In those circumstances, the 
shipowner may thus be regarded as having produced that waste within the 
meaning of Article 1(b) of Directive 75/442, and on that basis be categorised 
as a “holder” within the meaning of Article 1(c) of that directive.58  
 
However, Directive 75/442 „does not rule out the possibility that, in certain cases, the 
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cost of disposing of waste is to be borne by one or more previous holders‟,59 as 
established in Van de Walle. In accordance with the case law: 
 
Both Advocate General Kokott and the ECJ reached the conclusion that, even 
if it was in principle the ship owner who held the waste, the producer of heavy 
fuel oil as well as the seller and the oil tanker charterer could be held liable for 
waste disposal costs.60  
 
The financial burden is accordingly imposed on those who have contributed to the 
creation of the „waste‟ in some way and this includes contribution to any factors 
leading to the shipwreck itself and thus leading to the accidental production of 
„waste‟. It was therefore established that the national court may regard the seller of 
the hydrocarbons and charterer of the ship carrying them as „previous holders‟ if that 
court found that the seller-charterer „contributed to the risk that the pollution caused 
by the shipwreck would occur, in particular if he failed to take measures to prevent 
such an incident, such as measures concerning the choice of ship.‟61  
 
The ECJ also ruled that if full compensation for costs of disposal could not be met 
under the CLC and the FUND Convention, because the ceiling for compensation for 
that accident had been reached and liability limitations had been met, then national 
law should make provision for the costs to be borne by „the producer of the product 
from which the waste…came.‟62 This decision enables correct transposition of Article 
15 of Directive 75/442, ensuring that the polluter pays in circumstances where he has 
„contributed by his conduct to the risk that the pollution caused by the shipwreck will 
occur.‟63 
 
At the time of the Erika disaster, the third tier of the international compensation 
scheme had not yet come into force. This meant that the continued broad approach 
taken by the ECJ when interpreting EU waste legislation allowed the objectives of the 
„polluter pays‟ principle to be met, where limitations restricted the ability of the 
international scheme. The extension of the application of the „polluter pays‟ principle 
in EU waste law to the spilling of oil at sea allowed for costs of spilled oil to be 
covered where the international rules were not sufficient. The International 
Conventions dealing with liability and compensation were a more favourable option 
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for Total International Ltd and Total France SA. This was as a result of the fact that 
the CLC imposes liability on the owner of the oil tanker „which has the effect of 
paralysing any compensation claims for third parties‟,64 thus limiting liability for those 
to blame.  Even with the intervention of the FUND Convention, liability remains 
limited to the maximum values available, meaning that the costs of waste disposal 
may not ultimately be borne by those responsible for the pollution, „which seems 
contrary to the logic of the “polluter pays” principle.‟65 The ECJ was therefore 
presented with the contradiction, identified by Sadeleer, of „international rules limiting 
the liability of oil companies…and Article 15 of the Waste Framework Directive, which 
does not provide for any limitation on the liability of the waste holder.‟66 This conflict 
between EU law and the international liability regimes was dealt with by the ECJ 
when it noted that:  
The Community is not bound by the Liability Convention or the Fund 
Convention. In the first place, the Community has not acceded to those 
international instruments and, in the second place, it cannot be regarded as 
having taken the place of its Member States, if only because not all of them 
are parties to those conventions.67   
 
As such, the EU was not bound by any obligations arising from the international 
instruments. 
 
In its ruling, the ECJ also made reference to Directive 2004/3568 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. This 
directive contains specific provisions to exclude damage that falls within the scope of 
certain international Conventions.  
 
Article 4(2) states that: 
This Directive shall not apply to environmental damage or to any imminent 
threat of such damage arising from an incident in respect of which liability or 
compensation falls within the scope of any of the International Conventions 
listed in Annex IV…which is in force in the Member State concerned.69 
 
Both the CLC and FUND Conventions are listed in Annex IV and in relation to 
maritime oil disasters „preference was given to international environmental liability 
arrangements because…their scope is greater as they apply on a worldwide basis 
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and legally bind third countries as well as EU Member States.‟70 Recital 10 of 
Directive 2004/35 explicitly states that account should be taken of those activities 
where international Conventions are able to regulate „more comprehensively and 
more stringently‟ than the Directive itself.71 In the Commune de Mesquer case, the 
Belgian and United Kingdom governments did not feel that Directive 75/442 should 
apply to the circumstances at hand and considered it „preferable for the accidental 
spillage of hydrocarbons at sea to be covered exclusively by the Liability Convention 
and the Fund Convention.‟72 However, Directive 75/442, in contrast with Directive 
2004/35, contains no such limitation of that nature or any similar provision, even in 
the more recent, codified Directive 2006/12. Consequently, Directive 75/442 was held 
to be applicable to the spilling of oil and resulting pollution of the marine environment. 
 
This application of EU law, alongside an existing international regime, is an important 
step in ensuring enforcement of the „polluter pays‟ principle. It is also a demonstration 
of the EU ensuring adherence to obligations set out in Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which require that member states „take all 
the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive‟;73 in this 
case, this requires taking all measures necessary to enable the „protection of human 
health and the environment against harmful effects caused by the collection, 
transport, treatment, storage and tipping of waste.‟74 This in turn requires that 
national courts interpret law in light of the purpose of the directive, to comply with 
their obligations under Article 288 TFEU. This was confirmed in the case of 
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA75 and further 
supported in the case of Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne,76 
where the ECJ stated that interpretation by the courts must be in accordance with the 
objectives of the directive „whether the provisions in question were adopted before or 
after the directive or derive from international agreements entered into by the 
Member State.‟77 This ruling by the ECJ demonstrated the effectiveness of EU law in 
conjunction with international instruments when attempting to remedy pollution of the 
environment.  
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The ECJ ruling provides clear support at a European level for the importance of 
making polluters pay for the environmental costs of their activities, providing sufficient 
compensation for victims of oil pollution, and protecting the environment by ensuring 
the clean up and restoration costs of damage to the environment are covered. The 
ECJ‟s willingness, purposively, to extend EU waste legislation in both the Van de 
Walle and Commune de Mesquer decisions presents a clear message that liability for 
those responsible for causing pollution cannot be avoided as a result of limitations 
imposed at an international level. Although it is recognised that the international 
scheme aims to „ensure prompt and full compensation for oil pollution damage in an 
internationally uniform manner‟,78 disasters such as the Erika still highlight areas 
requiring improvement. The Erika disaster was therefore responsible for change at 
both an international level and an EU level by instigating the introduction of the 
Supplementary Fund and the application of EU waste legislation to oil spilled at sea. 
Although this perhaps represents a benefit in terms of future disasters, it is still a 
reflection of a scheme that seems to be responsive in many respects, relying on 
continued oil disasters to generate any fundamental changes. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been suggested that there are parallel arguments supporting environmental 
liability regimes, in that: 
They are seen as a tool for environmental protection, and they are seen as 
devices to improve the prospects that pollution victims are compensated for 
damage suffered.79  
 
The examination in this article of the laws and regulations on environmental liability in 
light of oil pollution has considered the extent to which the law is able to both protect 
the environment and compensate the victims of oil pollution. Numerous oil tanker 
disasters have consistently exposed the limits of the existing laws and regulations in 
this area. Highlighting the limitations of the system meant that these issues could be 
addressed and consequently refined in future legislation by way of amendments to 
existing legislation and the introduction of new provisions.  
 
Although the reactive approach has been responsible for the increase in 
compensation limits for victims of oil pollution damage, this was not an immediately 
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adequate solution and required continued pollution disasters to instigate a more 
appropriate increase in the maximum ceiling for compensation available. The 
continued legislative changes in this area suggest an unsatisfactory situation 
throughout the history of the international regime. This has meant that limitations 
have served to render the international legal regime insufficient in providing 
compensation to a number of victims at the time of the incidents responsible for the 
loss or damage they have suffered. This has prompted commentators to question: 
„what is the use of comprehensive liability if it can be subject to considerable 
limitations?‟80 However, it is suggested that both the introduction of the FUND 
Convention and the Supplementary Fund have increased the original ceiling limits to 
a level that will enable the law to achieve relative success in the future. This will help 
the laws and regulations in this field to meet their objectives, which are to provide 
adequate and prompt compensation to victims.  
Gradual amendments to the international regime have meant that the CLC and 
FUND Convention „have generally worked well in the large majority of over one 
hundred incidents resulting in claims to the IOPC Fund. Almost all of these claims 
have been met promptly and in full without resort to litigation‟.81 This suggests that, 
aside from the initial slow progress, the International Conventions are now 
increasingly able to achieve their aims in terms of providing sufficient compensation 
following an oil spill at sea. However, although this system has significantly improved 
over time, it cannot substitute or remove the need for litigation in some 
circumstances, as demonstrated in some of the cases examined in this article. In 
particular the Amoco Cadiz and Commune de Mesquer cases illustrate how a system 
containing limits is sometimes unacceptable. As a result the „judicial process remains 
an indispensable safety valve‟,82 enabling the victims of a disaster to combat the 
inadequacies of an unsatisfactory civil liability scheme. This process helps to 
stimulate development of the law in this field and ultimately allows victims and the 
courts to act as a checking system for the international regime, thereby ensuring that 
it reflects the needs of victims. 
The extent to which the laws and regulations considered here protect the 
environment is a more difficult issue to assess. It is suggested from the research 
considered that International Conventions regulating the structure and safety of 
tankers have improved tanker standards, thus acting as a preventative measure in 
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protecting the environment from unnecessary accidents. MARPOL has been 
particularly effective in improving the safety of tankers and equipment standards, 
which has ultimately reduced the amount of oil spilled into the ocean as a result of 
accidental oil spills. Accidents, however, remain unavoidable and therefore not fully 
preventable meaning that „oil pollution remains a problem, but probably a smaller one 
than experienced previously.‟83 
 
Protecting the environment by way of restoration of the environment itself after an oil 
spill is a more controversial element of the issues explored. The environment does 
not have any legal standing or rights,84 and any remedies awarded for damage are 
personal remedies for those who suffer damage or loss as a result of pollution 
damage to the environment. It is therefore a problem that the damages or 
compensation awarded after an incident do not have to be spent on repairing or 
restoring the environment. This means that the compensation schemes, although 
potentially sufficient for victims, cannot necessarily compensate the environment to 
the same extent. Due to the maximum amounts imposed for compensation in 
accordance with the CLC, FUND, and Supplementary Fund Conventions, full 
compensation can never be guaranteed for any one incident. Where this is the case, 
„payment of individual claims is not only reduced but delayed until contested claims 
are resolved, either by negotiation or in court, and governments may have to forego 
some of the clean-up and environmental-restoration claims.‟85 This evidently 
illustrates the problems associated with protection of the environment under a 
scheme „intended principally to compensate individuals for property and economic 
loss.‟86 Although the environment receives an ancillary benefit from the compensation 
scheme, it is not considered a primary victim and is consequently at the back of the 
queue in terms of importance. 
 
Overall the examination of the rules and regulations governing oil pollution of the 
marine environment has shown both strengths and weaknesses in the international 
legal regime. Clearly, legal recognition of the issues surrounding pollution in the oil 
and shipping industries has been a vital step in environmental law and an important 
confirmation of a growing global concern and understanding of a need to legislate 
activities with a risk of pollution to protect the natural environment. The weaknesses 
                                                        
83
 Young, Effectiveness of International Environment Regimes, p.49. 
84
 Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing?, (2010, 3
rd
 Edition) 
85
 Birnie et al., International Law & the Environment, p.439. 
86
 Ibid. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2012) 1 
 
95 
 
highlighted in this field have been addressed to improve the system and ensure that 
the same problems will not reoccur. The extent to which the updated legal regime will 
be able to meet the costs of future large-scale pollution disasters is yet to be seen 
and ultimately only time will tell. There is a limit to the environment‟s and the ocean‟s 
ability to re-generate itself following pollution. So far the ocean‟s ability to absorb and 
biodegrade the oil spilled at sea has meant that the slow pace of the international 
legal regime has not caused significant harm. This has allowed „time for the regime to 
learn how to become more effective.‟87 However, it remains to be seen just how 
much the regime has learnt from its mistakes. 
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